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Abstract
We present a new system, EEV, for verifying bi-
narized neural networks (BNNs). We formulate
BNN verification as a Boolean satisfiability prob-
lem (SAT) with reified cardinality constraints of
the form y = (x1 + · · ·+ xn ≤ b), where xi and
y are Boolean variables possibly with negation
and b is an integer constant. We also identify two
properties, specifically balanced weight sparsity
and lower cardinality bounds, that reduce the veri-
fication complexity of BNNs. EEV contains both
a SAT solver enhanced to handle reified cardinal-
ity constraints natively and novel training strate-
gies designed to reduce verification complexity by
delivering networks with improved sparsity prop-
erties and cardinality bounds. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of EEV by presenting the first exact
verification results for `∞-bounded adversarial ro-
bustness of nontrivial convolutional BNNs on the
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Our results also
show that, depending on the dataset and network
architecture, our techniques verify BNNs between
a factor of ten to ten thousand times faster than
the best previous exact verification techniques for
either binarized or real-valued networks.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has achieved impressive success in many
application fields including image understanding, speech
recognition, natural language processing, and game play-
ing (Goodfellow et al., 2016). While the intrinsic complexity
of deep neural networks (DNNs) enables them to learn diffi-
cult tasks, this complexity also hinders the understanding of
their behavior. Moreover, the existence of adversarial exam-
ples (Szegedy et al., 2014) directly exposes the fragility of
DNNs. Such fragility raises concerns for applying DNNs in
safety-critical environments such as autonomous driving or
aircraft control.
We present new techniques and a new system, EEV, for
exact verification of binarized neural networks (BNNs).
1MIT CSAIL. Correspondence to: Kai Jia <jiakai@mit.edu>.
Table 1. Preview of Results for MNIST and CIFAR10
Mean Solve
Time (s)
PGD
Accuracy
Verifiable
Accuracy
MNIST
 = 0.1
EEV 0.0009 95.35% 84.46%
Xiao et al. 0.49 95.13% 94.33%
MNIST
 = 0.3
EEV 0.0023 90.97% 36.41%
Xiao et al. 2.78 92.05% 80.68%
CIFAR10
 = 2
255
EEV 0.0019 39.47% 13.48%
Xiao et al. 13.50 49.92% 45.93%
CIFAR10
 = 8
255
EEV 0.0017 26.78% 10.79%
Xiao et al. 22.33 26.78% 20.27%
EEV is exact verification with EEV. Xiao et al. is exact veri-
fication for real-valued networks, with data taken from (Xiao
et al., 2019). Both use the conv-small network architecture
(binarized for EEV). See Table 4 for more results. While PGD
accuracy is comparable, verifiable accuracy is significantly
lower for EEV, reflecting the unavailability of a robust training
algorithm for BNNs. See Section 6.2 for more discussion.
EEV incorporates novel codesigned SAT solver and training
strategies. We deploy EEV to verify adversarial robustness
against input perturbations bounded by the `∞ norm. Com-
pared to the fastest previously existing exact verification
methods for this task, including methods for either binarized
or real-valued DNNs, our results show that, for our set of
MNIST and CIFAR10 benchmarks, our techniques improve
the verification performance by a factor of between ten to
ten thousand times depending on the dataset and network
architecture. This paper makes the following contributions:
1. We incorporate native support for reified cardinality
constraints into a SAT solver, improving the perfor-
mance of BNN verification by more than a factor of one
hundred compared to an unmodified SAT solver (Sec-
tion 4.4).
2. We identify that sparse weights induced by ternariza-
tion (Narodytska et al., 2020) cause unbalanced spar-
sity between layers of convolutional networks. While
ternarization achieves sufficient overall sparsity, our
results show that it also induces high verification com-
plexity. We propose a new strategy (BinMask), which
produces more balanced sparsity. Our results show that
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BinMask improves the performance of our verification
system by a factor of between one hundred to ten thou-
sand times compared to its performance on ternarized
networks (Section 5.1).
3. We further reduce verification complexity by introduc-
ing a cardinality bound decay regularizer with a tunable
tradeoff between accuracy and solving time, leading to
an additional speedup of up to a factor of thousands of
times (Section 5.2).
4. We present the first exact verification of `∞-bounded
adversarial robustness of convolutional BNNs on CI-
FAR10 (Table 1).
5. We present experimental results comparing EEV
against the best previously existing exact robustness
verification systems (for either binarized or real-valued
networks). These results show that, for the MNIST
and CFAR10 benchmarks, our system verifies exact
network robustness of given inputs between ten to ten
thousand times faster than these previous systems.
2. Background and Related Work
We formulate the problem of DNN exact verification (a.k.a.
complete verification) as checking whether a DNN satis-
fies given properties, for which the answer should either be
guaranteed satisfaction or a counterexample that violates
the properties. Researchers have developed a range of tech-
niques for verifying various properties of DNNs, mostly
for real-valued ReLU networks. They are largely based on
SMT solvers (Scheibler et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2017;
Katz et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017) or Mixed Integer Linear
Programming (MILP) (Lomuscio & Maganti, 2017; Cheng
et al., 2017; Fischetti & Jo, 2018; Dutta et al., 2018; Tjeng
et al., 2019; Yang & Rinard, 2019). Another line of research
delivers guaranteed robustness via incomplete verification
(a.k.a. certification) that may fail to prove or disprove the
desired properties in certain cases (Wong & Kolter, 2017;
Weng et al., 2018; Gehr et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018;
Raghunathan et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018; Mirman
et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2019). This research often ex-
plores the idea of over-approximation to improve scalability,
where the verifier considers a relaxed form of the actual
computation in a DNN. In this paper we focus on exact
verification.
Binarized neural networks (BNNs) (Hubara et al., 2016)
constrain activations and weights to be binary, resulting
in significant speed gain and energy saving during infer-
ence (Hubara et al., 2016; Rastegari et al., 2016; Moss et al.,
2017) with tolerable accuracy degeneration (Darabi et al.,
2018). Moreover, binarization facilitates analysis because
the combinatorial nature of BNNs enables close interaction
with logical reasoning, allowing a rich set of properties to
be encoded in conjunctive normal form (CNF). Examples
include queries on adversarial robustness, trojan attacks,
fairness, network equivalence, and model counting (Nar-
odytska et al., 2018; Baluta et al., 2019). The exact SAT
encoding of BNNs is quite straightforward, compared to
MILP methods which usually need to estimate the bounds of
hidden neurons during verification for a given input. More-
over, it has been shown that exact verification of real-valued
neural networks suffers from numerical error present in both
the verifier and the inference implementation that allows
adversarial examples to be constructed for networks with
verified robustness (Jia & Rinard, 2020), while a BNN satis-
fies the verified properties on any correct inference imple-
mentation. Analysis techniques for BNNs include efficient
encoding (Shih et al., 2019) and exploiting decomposability
between neurons or layers (Cheng et al., 2018; Khalil et al.,
2019).
Adversarial attack and defense of DNNs is a developing field
where most research focuses on real-valued networks (Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Madry et al.,
2018; Kannan et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020). BNNs can
also be attacked by gradient-based adversaries (Galloway
et al., 2018) or specialized solving algorithms (Khalil et al.,
2019).
Until recently, exact verification of DNNs was too computa-
tionally expensive to scale beyond a few hundred neurons.
(Tjeng et al., 2019) present the first exact verification result
for convolutional neural networks (CNNs) on MNIST by
tightening the MILP formulation. A subsequent improve-
ment induces stability of ReLU neurons during training
(Xiao et al., 2019). (Narodytska et al., 2020) verify a non-
trivial binarized multilayer perceptron on MNIST.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. The Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT)
SAT is the problem of deciding whether there exists a satis-
fying variable assignment for a given Boolean expression
(Biere et al., 2009). We consider Boolean expressions in con-
junctive normal form (CNF) defined over a set of Boolean
variables x1, · · · , xn. A CNF e is a conjunction of a set of
clauses e = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm where each clause ci is a disjunc-
tion of some literals ci = li1 ∨ · · · ∨ lisi , and a literal lij is
either a variable or its negation: lij = xk or lij = ¬xk.
Despite the well known fact that 3-SAT is NP-complete
(Cook, 1971), efficient heuristics have been developed to
enable SAT solvers to scale to industrial problems (Balyo
et al., 2017).
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3.2. Binarized Neural Networks (BNNs)
Binarization of neural networks is a special case of network
quantization, proposed as a method to reduce the computa-
tion burden and speed up inference and possibly also train-
ing (Rastegari et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2016; Jacob et al.,
2018). We follow the framework of (Hubara et al., 2016),
but modify the activation values from {−1, 1} to {0, 1}.
The basic building block of a BNN is a linear-BatchNorm-
binarize operation that maps an input tensor x ∈ {0, 1}n
to an output tensor y ∈ {0, 1}m with a weight parameter
W ∈ Rw:
y = binact(BatchNorm(linear(x,binw(W )))) (1)
where binact(x) = (sign(x) + 1)/2 ∈ {0, 1}
binw(x) = sign(x) ∈ {−1, 1}
linear ∈ {convolution,matmul}
Note that the use of {0, 1} rather than {−1, 1} for activa-
tions does not impact network capacity, because it is a linear
transformation on the activations and can be cancelled by
the following batch normalization. Besides simplifying the
conversion to SAT formulas, using a {0, 1} encoding also
makes zero padding for convolutional layers trivial.
Although the sign function has zero gradient almost ev-
erywhere, we can still train a BNN using gradient based
optimizers by adopting the straight-through estimator (Ben-
gio et al., 2013) which treats the sign function as an identity
function during backpropagation.
First layer: The first layer of a BNN is usually applied
on float or 8-bit fixed point inputs since it has many fewer
channels and would not be a major issue for performance.
However encoding floating-point or integer arithmetics in
SAT incurs high complexity, and we add an extra quantiza-
tion layer to process the input:
xq =
⌊x
s
⌉
· s (2)
where x ∈ [0, 1]n is the real valued input, xq is the quantized
input to be fed into the BNN, and s is the quantization step
size which can be set to s = 1/255 for emulating 8-bit fixed
point values, or 2 for adversarial training with `∞ norm
bounded by .
Last layer: We consider the layer before softmax as the
last layer of the BNN, whose output can be interpreted as
classification score. We remove the binact in (1) to obtain
a real valued score. To enable direct conversion into SAT,
we also restrict the running variance and scale parameter in
BatchNorm of the last layer to be a scalar computed on the
whole feature map rather than per-channel statistics.
4. Combinatorial Analysis of BNNs
4.1. Encoding BNNs with Reified Cardinality
Constraints
We discuss techniques for encoding a trained BNN as a SAT
formula, focusing on the details of encoding a single layer.
During inference the Batch Normalization becomes a linear
transformation (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015):
xBN = kBNx+ bBN
where kBN =
γ√
Var[x] + 
bBN = β − kBN E[x]
With W bin = binw(W ) being a fixed parameter, we can
rewrite (1) as the following, where x ∈ {0, 1}n is the layer
input and y ∈ {0, 1}m is the layer output with 0 interpreted
as FALSE and 1 interpreted as TRUE:
y = (kBN linear(x,W bin) + bBN ≥ 0) (3)
To convert linear(x,W bin) into a Boolean expression, we
consider the simple case of dot-product dot(x,W bin) =∑n
i=1 xiW
bin
i , which can be easily extended to handle
convolutional or fully connected layers. If W bini = 1,
we have xiW bini = xi; and if W
bin
i = −1, we rewrite
xiW
bin
i = −xi = (1− xi)− 1 = (¬xi)− 1. Therefore
dot(x,W bin) =
n∑
i=1
li + b
SAT
where li =
{
xi if W bini = 1
¬xi if W bini = −1
bSAT =
n∑
i=1
min
(
W bini , 0
)
Now (3) can be rewritten as a reified cardinality constraint,
where R acts as ≥ or ≤ according to the sign of kBN and b
can be rounded to an integer accordingly:
y =
(
n∑
i=1
li R b
)
(4)
where b = − b
BN
kBN
− bSAT
Cardinality constraints belong to a more general class called
pseudo-Boolean constraints, which allow literals to be mul-
tiplied by integer coefficients. They are usually converted
to CNF formulas by encoders such as sequential coun-
ters (Sinz, 2005; Ho¨lldobler et al., 2012) or binary decision
diagrams (Abı´o et al., 2011). Rather than using a standard
SAT solver on the encoded formula, we extend the SAT
solver to handle such constraints natively.
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4.2. Encoding for Adversarial Attacks
Input Perturbation Encoding: We discuss how to con-
strain the solver space within a `∞ bound around the given
input x0. We will focus on a single scalar in the input tensor
for simplicity, but it easily applies to the whole tensor under
`∞ norm. Recall that we quantize an input x with step size
s in (2), allowing us to rewrite the first layer as
y =
(
kBN linear
(⌊x
s
⌉
s,W bin
)
+ bBN ≥ 0
)
=
(
(kBNs) linear
(⌊x
s
⌉
,W bin
)
+ bBN ≥ 0
)
This formulation suggests that we can treat kBNs as the
coefficient for Batch Normalization in (4) during inference
so that the input
⌊
x
s
⌉
is an integer. For adversarial attacks
on x0 with ‖x− x0‖∞ ≤ , we encode the attack space
as
⌊
x
s
⌉
= L(x0) +
∑k
i=1 ti where L(x0) =
⌊
max(x0−,0)
s
⌉
and U(x0) =
⌊
min(x0+,1)
s
⌉
are the bounds of allowed
input, k = U(x0) − L(x0) is the possible range, and
{t1, · · · , tk} are Boolean variables whose sum corresponds
to the value of adversarial inputs. We further restrict the
search space by enforcing the thermometer encoding (Buck-
man et al., 2018) on {t1, · · · , tk}, via adding additional
clauses ti ∨ ¬tj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
Untargeted Attack Encoding: Assume there are m out-
put classes and C is the target class, such that the adver-
sary tries to cause the network to output a classification
other than C. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ Rm denote the
input and output of the last layer respectively. Similar to
the analysis in Section 4.1, we can rewrite y in the form
yj = k
BN (
∑n
i=1 lij + bj). Note that we have required k
BN
to be a scalar in the last layer. To ensure that the network
makes a wrong prediction, we add a clause∨1≤j 6=C≤m(rjC)
where rjC = (yj − yC ≥ δ) is a decision variable indicat-
ing whether the confidence of class j exceeds that of class
C by a margin of δ. Note that rjC = (yj − yC ≥ δ) =(
kBN (
∑n
i=1(lij − liC) + bj − bC) ≥ δ
)
is also a reified
cardinality constraint, except that the weight on some xi
may be up to 2, which can be handled by duplicating the
literal. We set δ = 10−6
∣∣kBN∣∣ in our experiments.
Given a BNN and an input image, a formula can be obtained
by encoding the input constraints, the BNN itself and the
output constraints using the techniques outlined above. If a
SAT solver finds a solution for the formula, then an adver-
sarial input can be recovered from the solution. Otherwise
the network is proven to be robust for this input.
4.3. Extending the CDCL Algorithm
Modern SAT solvers typically utilize the conflict-driven
clause learning (CDCL) algorithm (Marques-Silva et al.,
2009), which tries to reduce the search space by learning
new clauses from conflicts. There are three key procedures
in this algorithm:
1. Branching: Pick an undecided variable and assign a
value to it. The order of branching is usually decided
by heuristics like VSIDS (Moskewicz et al., 2001).
2. Propagation: Given current branching and propagation
decisions, try to infer values of undecided variables.
Such inference is based on the crucial concept of unit
clause that contains only one unassigned literal: if there
is a clause c = l1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln in the clause database and
l1, . . . , ln−1 are all known to be false, then ln must be
true so the whole clause could be satisfied.
3. Clause Learning: When a conflict is encountered, a
new clause is constructed and inserted into the clause
database by summarizing the reasons that lead to the
conflict. The learning is performed on the implication
graph, whose nodes correspond to assignments of vari-
ables. For a node [x = a], it has incoming edges from
[y1 = b1], . . . , [yk = bk] such that they are the condi-
tions to imply x = a (i.e., there is a clause contain-
ing exactly y1, . . . , yk, x and all literals corresponding
to {yi} are false in the clause given the assignment
yi = bi). Branching variables have no incoming edges
in the graph. Starting from a special node represent-
ing the conflict, the graph is traversed in reverse order
to enumerate all branching variables that lead to the
conflict. Disjunction of negation of those variables are
added to the set of learned clauses.
The propagation and clause learning processes can be gen-
eralized to handle clauses not in disjunctive form, as long
as each clause permits inferring values of undecided vari-
ables. This idea has been explored in the literature to extend
SAT solvers to domain-specific problems (Soos et al., 2009;
Liffiton & Maglalang, 2012; Ganesh et al., 2012).
Given a reified cardinality constraint l = (
∑n
i=1 li ≤ b),
there are two types of propagations:
• Operand-inferring: If l is known and enough of the
{li} are known, then the remaining {li} can be inferred.
For example, if l is known to be true and there are
already b literals in {li} known to be true, then the
other literals must be false.
• Target-inferring: If enough of the {li} are known, then
l can be inferred. For example, if the number of false
literals in {li} reaches n− b, then l can be inferred to
be true.
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Figure 1. Performance comparison of SAT solvers. The run-
ning times are collected by applying the solver to find adversar-
ial inputs for the MNIST-MLP network described in Section 6.
Our MNIST-MLP network achieves 97.4%test accuracy with
29Kparameters, compared to 95.2%accuracy with 20Kparameters
reported by (Narodytska et al., 2020). We evaluate MinisatCS,
MiniSat and Z3 on a fixed random subset containing 40 test ex-
amples, and also present MinisatCS-full for the performance
evaluated on the complete MNIST test set.
4.4. MiniSatCS: An Efficient Implementation
We present MiniSatCS, an novel system with native sup-
port for reified cardinality constraints. MiniSatCS is
based on MiniSat 2.2 (Ee´n & So¨rensson, 2003). An im-
portant design in modern SAT solvers is the use of watched
literals (Moskewicz et al., 2001), which allows rapid de-
tection of unit clauses. In the case of reified cardinality
constraints, we keep similar watchers for each variable, and
maintain counters for the current number of known true or
false literals for each clause, so the situations that allow
propagation can be detected without scanning the whole
clause every time a variable changes. We use random polar-
ity and turned off phase saving (Pipatsrisawat & Darwiche,
2007) in the solver since it is faster for BNN verification.
The SAT formula encoding of a BNN is constant for differ-
ent input values, in contrast with MILP-base methods that
need to estimate the bounds of hidden neurons for each in-
put. Therefore we have designed a model cache mechanism
in MinisatCS to reuse the set of formulas corresponding
to the BNN for different test cases, reducing model build
time by ten times for the large networks.
We compare the performance of MinisatCS on the
MNIST-MLP network against two other solvers: the un-
modified MiniSat 2.2 using a sequential counter en-
coder for reified cardinality constraints, and an SMT solver
Z3 (De Moura & Bjørner, 2008) that has native pseudo-
Boolean logic support. From Figure 1 we can see that our
system is significantly more efficient than previous ones on
Table 2. Comparing BinMask and Ternary Weight
MNIST CIFAR10
Mean Solve
Time (s)
Ternary 964.8776 381.3879
BinMask 0.0004 0.3082
Max Solve
Time (s)
Ternary 3600.017 3600.028
BinMask 0.004 2.870
Test
Accuracy
Ternary 97.56% 52.76%
BinMask 97.53% 50.09%
Total
Sparsity
Ternary 80% 86%
BinMask 83% 80%
Layer-wise
Sparsity
Ternary 16% 38% 83% 30% 14% 45% 88% 30%
BinMask 93% 89% 83% 92% 95% 91% 79% 93%
Verifiable
Accuracy
Ternary 0% 0%
BinMask 90% 0%
We applied the MiniSatCS solver to search adversarial inputs for an unde-
fended small-conv network with  = 0.01 under a time limit of 3600 sec-
onds. Input quantization step is s = 1/255. Solver time is evaluated on a fixed
random subset containing 40 examples from the test set. For Ternary network we
set T = 0.005 and applied `1 regularization of 1e−5 and 5e−5 for MNIST
and CIFAR10 respectively, to achieve similar total sparsity with BinMask. More
details on experimental settings are described in Section 6.
verification of BNNs, and hundreds of times faster than the
prior state-of-the-art result on the same task (Narodytska
et al., 2020).
5. Training Solver-friendly BNNs
5.1. BinMask: Balanced Weight Sparsifying
It has been observed that sparse weights facilitate verifi-
cation of neural networks (Tjeng et al., 2019; Xiao et al.,
2019; Narodytska et al., 2020). A common sparsifying
method (Narodytska et al., 2020) for BNNs is to use ternary
weights, i.e. setting binw(W ) = 0 when |W | < T . How-
ever this technique suffers from two drawbacks: (i) The
threshold T and the penalty coefficient for `1 regularization
are two coupled parameters that need tuning, and (ii) For
convolutional networks, the sparsity of convolutional lay-
ers is usually lower than that of fully connected layers,
which has also been observed during pruning real-valued
networks (Han et al., 2015).
Such unbalanced sparsity complicates verification because
convolutional layers bear most of the computation bur-
den. In this case their low sparsity reduces the verification
speedup. While it is possible to prune each layer with a fixed
rate and retrain the network iteratively (Frankle & Carbin,
2019), such methods are especially costly when we consider
adversarial training.
To this end, we hypothesize that this unbalancing in BNNs
is caused by a uniform setting of T with coupled optimiza-
tion of both weight sparsity and weight values. The zero
in the ternary weights creates a gap between −1 and 1, re-
quiring the weight to go through the zero zone even when a
sign change suffices. Since the convolutional and fully con-
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Table 3. Effect of Cardinality Bound Decay
MNIST CIFAR10
η = 0 η = 1e−5 η = 5e−4 η = 0 η = 1e−5 η = 1e−4
Mean Solve Time (s) 2200.503 1332.398 0.318 3.343 3.642 0.048
Max Solve Time (s) 3600.014 3600.014 7.595 93.188 54.192 0.127
Test Accuracy 99.01% 98.73% 97.05% 53.51% 48.17% 42.35%
Provable Accuracy (Timeout%) 5% (60%) 5% (30%) 25% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 2% (0%)
Mean / Max Cardinality Bound 235.4 / 561.6 8.1 / 61.9 3.4 / 11.6 334.7 / 771.4 14.5 / 66.7 5.0 / 33.9
First Layer / Total Sparsity 84% / 72% 84% / 83% 88% / 88% 94% / 68% 94% / 86% 95% / 81%
These results are obtained from large-conv networks trained adversarially with  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 8/255 for CIFAR10.
As η decreases, the solve times decrease significantly with decreasing but still comparable accuracy. We only evaluate these networks
on a fixed random subset containing 40 images from the test set due to limited computing resource, with a timeout of 3600 seconds.
Details of adversarial training are described in Section 6.
nected layers have different dynamics during training but
T is not tuned layer-wise, their sparsity diverges as a result.
Therefore we propose to decouple weight value and weight
sparsity by introducing a binary mask to be applied on the
weights. More formally, for each weight W we introduce a
new mask weight MW that is to be optimized independently
of W and define
binw(W ) = sign(W ) · sign(MW ) + 1
2
(5)
We call this method BinMask and summarize an empirical
comparison with ternary weights in Table 2. Although these
two methods achieve similar total sparsities and similar
accuracies, sparsity of individual layers is more balanced in
BinMask, and consequently its verification is thousands of
times faster.
5.2. Cardinality Bound Decay
While BinMask alone sparsifies the small network enough to
be efficiently verified, it is not sufficient for a larger network.
To further reduce verification complexity, we revisit the
reified cardinality constraint y = (
∑n
i=1 li ≤ b) and note
the following facts:
1. If it is encoded into CNF using sequential coun-
ters (Sinz, 2005) by introducing auxiliary variables
rij to encode whether
∑i
k=1 lk ≤ j, then O(nb) vari-
ables and O(nb) clauses are needed for the encoding.
Thus smaller b produces simpler encoding.
2. MiniSatCS can infer y to be false once the number of
true literals in {li} exceeds b, and a smaller b increases
the likelihood of this inference.
3. If the literals {li} are drawn from independent
Bernoulli distribution parameterized with probability
0.5, then the entropy of y is a symmetrical concave
function with respect to b maximized when b = n2 .
Therefore the further b deviates from n2 , the more pre-
dictable y becomes.
We are thus motivated to regularize the bound in reified
cardinality constraints to reduce verification complexity. We
propose a Cardinality Bound Decay (CBD) loss to achieve
this goal, by adding an `1 penalty of strength η on the bias
term b in (4). We also introduce a parameter τ so that
bounds below τ do not get penalized, and set τ = 5 in
all of our experiments. Meaningful setting of τ should be
non-negative because if b drops below zero, then
∑
i li R b
becomes constantly true or false and the bound should not be
penalized anyway. The CBD loss term is formally defined
as:
LCBD = ηmax
(
− b
BN
kBN
− bSAT − τ, 0
)
(6)
It is worth noting that since
∑n
i=1 li ≤ b is equivalent to∑n
i=1 ¬li ≥ n − b, we only consider the value of b rather
than
∣∣b− n2 ∣∣ in this loss. Table 3 summarizes our empirical
evaluation of the performance of CBD loss. Our proposed
method effectively reduces the bounds in cardinality con-
straints and speeds up verification significantly, and the
parameter η can be tuned to control the tradeoff between
accuracy and verification speed. Notably although CBD
also introduces weight sparsity, it is not an alternative for
weight sparsifying, which can be observed from the last two
experiments on CIFAR10.
6. Experiments
6.1. Experimental Environment and Methods
We conduct our experiments on a workstation equipped
with two GPUs (NVIDIA Titan RTX and NVIDIA GeForce
RTX 2070 SUPER), 128 GiB of RAM and an AMD Ryzen
Threadripper 2970WX 24-core processor. We used the Py-
Torch (Paszke et al., 2019) framework to train all the net-
works. We evaluated our methods using adversarial attack
as an example task on two datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al.,
1998) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009). Unless stated
otherwise, we limit the execution time to 120 seconds for
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the MiniSatCS solver per input image as in (Xiao et al.,
2019).
Network Architecture: We adopt three network architec-
tures from the literature for the evaluation of EEV:
1. MNIST-MLP: This is a binarized multilayer percep-
tron with hidden layers having [500, 300, 200, 100, 10]
units (Narodytska et al., 2020) . It is trained with an
input quantization step s = 0.1 and sparsified by Bin-
Mask.
2. Small-conv: This is a network with two convolu-
tional layers of 16 and 32 channels, followed by two
fully connected layers with 100 and 10 units. The con-
volutional layers have 4 × 4 filters and 2 × 2 stride
with a padding of 1. The architecture is the same as in
(Xiao et al., 2019) except that we binarize the network.
3. Large-conv: This is a network extending the
small-conv, where each convolutional layer is pre-
ceded by another 3 × 3 convolution with a padding
of 1. The convolutional layers have [32, 32, 64, 64]
channels and there are three fully connected layers
with [512, 512, 10] output units. The architecture is the
same as in (Xiao et al., 2019) except that we binarize
the network.
Training Method We train the networks using the Adam
optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) for 200 epochs with a mini-
batch size of 128. Due to fluctuations of test accuracy be-
tween epochs, we select from the last five epochs the model
having the highest accuracy on the first 40 training mini-
batches. Learning rate is initially 1e−4 and decayed by a
factor of two for the last 50 epochs. We use projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) to generate adversarial examples for ro-
bust training as in (Madry et al., 2018), where  is increased
linearly from 0 to the desired value in the first 100 epochs
and the number of PGD iteration steps grows linearly from 0
to 10 in the first 50 epochs. All weights are initialized from
a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation 0.01, and
the mask weights MW in (5) are enforced to be positive by
taking the absolute value at initialization. We apply a weight
decay of 1e−7 on binarized MW in all experiments. For
training on the MNIST dataset the input quantization step
s is set to be 0.61. We set s = 0.064 ≈ 16.3/255 for CI-
FAR10. These input quantization steps s are slightly greater
than twice the largest perturbation bound we consider for
each dataset. The CBD loss is applied on large-conv
networks only and η is set to be 5e−4 for MNIST and 1e−4
for CIFAR10. We do not use any data augmentation tech-
niques for training. Due to limited computing resource and
significant differences between the settings we considered,
data in this paper are reported based on one evaluation run.
6.2. Evaluating Adversarial Robustness
We evaluate the performance of EEV on the MNIST and
CIFAR10 benchmarks. We train MNIST-MLP on MNIST
only for comparison against (Narodytska et al., 2020), the
previous fastest exactly verified BNN on MNIST. Figure 1
presents the results. For the other two network architectures,
we train an undefended network on natural images and two
robust networks against the PGD adversary with different
`∞ bounds on both MNIST and CIFAR10. We evaluate the
robustness of each network against two adversaries, a 100-
step PGD and our exact verifier, with three settings of the `∞
bound. We also compare our results with the state-of-the-art
exact verifier for real-valued networks (Xiao et al., 2019).
Table 4 presents detailed results of verifier performance
and test accuracy, showing that our verifier exhibits solving
times 16.13 to 12815.62 times faster than (Xiao et al., 2019).
We highlight an interesting observation. An undefended
CIFAR10 network has only 0.06% PGD accuracy on the
largest `∞ bound we considered, and adversarial training im-
proves the number to 26.78%, comparable with real-valued
networks. However if we evaluate the true adversarial ro-
bustness by applying our exact verifier, the undefended
network totally fails (0.00% adversarially robust) while the
seemingly robust network achieves only 10.79% adversarial
accuracy. This suggests that first-order adversaries like PGD
may be insufficient to explore the adversarial space of BNNs
for robust training. We remark that the gap between PGD
accuracy and verifiable accuracy is unlikely to be caused by
obfuscated gradients (Athalye et al., 2018) because (i) suc-
cess rate of PGD attack is higher when perturbation bound
is increased and PGD training does improve PGD accuracy
significantly, suggesting that gradient information is still
useful for attacks, and (ii) we use the straight-through-es-
timator to compute gradients of the activation binarization
and input quantization functions, which is the same method
for training the networks, and gradients are unlikely to be
shattered in this way.
6.3. Extensibility Case Study
We evaluate the extensibility of our system by considering
an ensemble ofM models that rejects the input if they do not
fully agree on the classification. We are interested in how
easily this ensemble can be attacked by requiring the adver-
sary to cause all of the components to output the same wrong
classification. The goal can be easily formulated in CNF:
Let n be the number of classes, C be the correct class and
rmij denote whether score of class i is higher than j in model
m as defined in Section 4.2. Let fmi = ∧1≤j 6=i≤n(rmij )
denote whether class i has the highest score by model m
and gi = ∧1≤m≤M (fmi ) denote whether all models agree
on class i. Then the attack goal is simply ∨1≤i≤ngi. Such
an encoding would not be so straightforward if we were
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Table 4. Verification Time and Test Accuracy on MNIST and CIFAR10 Benchmarks
Dataset Method Mean Solve Time Solver Timeout Mean Build+Solve Time
Training   = 0  = 1  = 2  = 0  = 1  = 2  = 0  = 1  = 2
MNIST conv-small 0.0023 0.2428 0.2464 0% 0.07% 0.07% 0.0179 0.2599 0.2795
MNIST
 = 0.1
conv-small 0.0009 0.0107 0.1594 0% 0% 0.05% 0.0169 0.0397 0.1756
Xiao et al. S 0.49 - - 0.05% - - 5.47 - -
MNIST
 = 0.3
conv-small 0.0003 0.0008 0.0023 0% 0% 0% 0.0311 0.0301 0.0170
Xiao et al. S - - 2.78 - - 1% - - 7.12
conv-large 0.0052 0.1786 2.3221 0% 0.04% 1% 0.1145 0.2910 2.4458
Xiao et al. L - - 37.45 - - 24% - - 203.84
CIFAR10 conv-small 0.0038 0.0054 0.0075 0% 0% 0% 0.0468 0.0555 0.0610
CIFAR10
 = 2/255
conv-small 0.0019 0.0035 0.0033 0% 0% 0% 0.0433 0.0530 0.0540
Xiao et al. S 13.50 - - 2% - - 66.08 - -
CIFAR10
 = 8/255
conv-small 0.0012 0.0018 0.0017 0% 0% 0% 0.0406 0.0484 0.0476
Xiao et al. S - - 22.33 - - 2% - - 60.67
conv-large 0.0899 0.0326 0.0566 0.04% 0% 0% 0.3397 0.2615 0.3521
Xiao et al. L - - 20.14 - - 5% - - 421.86
Dataset Method Test Accuracy PGD Adversarial Accuracy Verifiable Adversarial Accuracy
Training   = 0  = 1  = 2  = 0  = 1  = 2
MNIST conv-small 97.06% 92.98% 84.81% 67.57% 75.29% 26.17% 2.55%
MNIST
 = 0.1
conv-small 97.16% 95.35% 92.82% 86.57% 84.46% 48.71% 11.69%
Xiao et al. S 98.68% 95.13% - - 94.33% - -
MNIST
 = 0.3
conv-small 95.53% 94.61% 93.37% 90.97% 87.08% 68.28% 36.41%
Xiao et al. S 97.33% - - 92.05% - - 80.68%
conv-large 97.05% 96.22% 95.07% 92.40% 88.24% 62.38% 21.52%
Xiao et al. L 97.54% - - 93.25% - - 59.60%
CIFAR10 conv-small 51.67% 15.13% 0.83% 0.06% 0.36% 0.02% 0.00%
CIFAR10
 = 2/255
conv-small 46.57% 39.47% 27.79% 19.00% 13.48% 1.63% 0.26%
Xiao et al. S 61.12% 49.92% - - 45.93% - -
CIFAR10
 = 8/255
conv-small 33.18% 31.63% 29.03% 26.78% 24.75% 15.91% 10.79%
Xiao et al. S 40.45% - - 26.78% - - 20.27%
conv-large 42.35% 40.44% 37.70% 34.30% 3.86% 0.37% 0.15%
Xiao et al. L 42.81% - - 28.69% - - 19.80%
We present results of our system on BNNs and compare against real-valued networks of the same architecture in (Xiao et al., 2019).
“Xiao et al. S” and “Xiao et al. L” correspond to real-valued networks conv-small and conv-large respectively, with data taken
from Xiao et al.. We conduct a complete evaluation of the large architecture while Xiao et al. evaluate only the first 1000 images due
to long build time. We set (0, 1, 2) = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) for MNIST and (0, 1, 2) = (2/255, 5/255, 8/255) for CIFAR10.
Table 5. Model Ensemble with Reject Option on MNIST
Test
Accuracy
Mean
Solve Time
(s)
Attack
Success
Rate
small-conv 95.53% 0.002 63.59%
large-conv 97.05% 2.322 78.48%
ensemble 94.26% 2.330 47.44%
working with other formulations such as MILP. We present
in Table 5 the results of an ensemble of small-conv and
large-conv networks on MNIST adversarially trained
and tested with `∞ bound 0.3. It shows that our system can
easily handle more complex queries.
6.4. Validating Training Methods
We conduct comprehensive experiments to validate that our
proposed training methods significantly reduce verification
complexity without sacrificing much test accuracy.
For each dataset, we train the conv-small and
conv-large networks under two training settings: un-
defended (i.e.,  = 0) and PGD-based adversarial training
with a large perturbation bound ( = 0.3 for MNIST and
 = 8/255 for CFAR10). The undefended network can be
regarded as a reference of test accuracy for the architec-
ture under specific sparsity. The results show that on all
the data sets and adversarial training perturbation bounds
that we have considered, our proposed solver MiniSatCS
is consistently faster than MiniSat 2.2 and Z3, reach-
Efficient Exact Verification of Binarized Neural Networks
Table 6. Comparison of Methods on MNIST Subset
train
Network
Architecture Training Method
Solver Test
Accuracy
Mean Solve
Time
Median
Solve Time
Timeout Verifiable
Accuracy
Overall
Sparsity
0
conv-small
Ternary MiniSatCS 97.28% 212.084 2.587 3% 0% 79%
BinMask
MiniSatCS 97.06% 0.001 0.001 0% 75% 86%
MiniSat 2.2 97.06% 0.944 0.536 0% 75% 86%
z3 97.06% 0.079 0.078 0% 75% 86%
conv-large
Ternary MiniSatCS 98.89% 2732.030 3600.004 72% 0% 82%
Ternary+CBD MiniSatCS 97.50% 1190.475 166.054 28% 0% 60%
BinMask MiniSatCS 99.01% 1259.135 169.778 28% 52% 81%
BinMask
+CBD
MiniSatCS 97.84% 7.195 0.221 0% 38% 87%
MiniSat 2.2 97.84% 979.900 125.950 18% 32% 87%
z3 97.84% 1155.247 39.132 25% 22% 87%
0.3
conv-small
Ternary MiniSatCS 96.18% 704.245 0.376 18% 12% 73%
BinMask
MiniSatCS 95.53% 0.002 0.002 0% 32% 91%
MiniSat 2.2 95.53% 0.519 0.377 0% 32% 91%
z3 95.53% 0.062 0.061 0% 32% 91%
conv-large
Ternary MiniSatCS 98.35% 2811.341 3600.003 78% 0% 87%
BinMask MiniSatCS 99.01% 2200.503 3600.002 60% 5% 72%
BinMask
+CBD
MiniSatCS 97.05% 0.318 0.021 0% 25% 88%
MiniSat 2.2 97.05% 159.477 6.248 3% 25% 88%
z3 97.05% 219.558 1.482 0% 25% 88%
All the methods are evaluated on a fixed subset containing 40 randomly sampled examples from the MNIST test set. Time limit is 3600 seconds.
Table 7. Comparison of Methods on CIFAR10 Subset
train
Network
Architecture Training Method
Solver Test
Accuracy
Mean Solve
Time
Median
Solve Time
Timeout Verifiable
Accuracy
Overall
Sparsity
0
conv-small
Ternary
MiniSatCS 53.72% 64.366 0.009 0% 0% 83%
MiniSat 2.2 53.72% 352.748 93.883 3% 0% 83%
z3 53.72% 1612.839 870.972 25% 0% 83%
BinMask
MiniSatCS 51.67% 0.003 0.003 0% 2% 81%
MiniSat 2.2 51.67% 6.262 5.601 0% 2% 81%
z3 51.67% 0.186 0.174 0% 2% 81%
conv-large
Ternary MiniSatCS 66.15% 774.398 2.506 18% 0% 89%
BinMask MiniSatCS 65.85% 235.996 0.171 3% 0% 91%
BinMask
+CBD
MiniSatCS 65.15% 19.585 0.095 0% 0% 93%
MiniSat 2.2 65.15% 865.934 378.570 5% 0% 93%
z3 65.15% 3600.195 3600.190 100% 0% 93%
8
255
conv-small
Ternary MiniSatCS 35.88% 0.305 0.005 0% 0% 89%
BinMask
MiniSatCS 33.18% 0.002 0.002 0% 8% 88%
MiniSat 2.2 33.18% 0.718 0.710 0% 8% 88%
z3 33.18% 0.071 0.070 0% 8% 88%
conv-large
Ternary MiniSatCS 39.27% 112.048 0.359 3% 0% 82%
BinMask MiniSatCS 53.51% 3.343 0.111 0% 0% 68%
BinMask
+CBD
MiniSatCS 42.35% 0.048 0.044 0% 2% 81%
MiniSat 2.2 42.35% 13.175 9.460 0% 2% 81%
z3 42.35% 152.297 26.479 0% 2% 81%
All the methods are evaluated on a fixed subset containing 40 randomly sampled examples from the CIFAR10 test set. Time limit is 3600 seconds.
ing a speedup by a factor of between 5.48 to 500.76 times
compared to the fastest of the other two. Our proposed
training methods, BinMask and Cardinality Bound Decay
(CBD), work together to significantly reduce verification
time at the cost of some small degradation of test accuracy.
Specifically, compared to ternary weights, BinMask with
CBD delivers verification speedup by a factor of between
39.54 to 406490.81 times, with accuracy degradation less
than 2% for MNIST and less than 3% for CIFAR10. A pos-
itive side effect of BinMask is that it improves robustness,
possibly due to improved sparsity of convolutional layers.
Note that CBD works better with BinMask, and combining
ternary weights with CBD results in worse accuracy and
longer verification time of the conv-large architecture
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Table 8. MiniSatCS Results on Full Dataset
Dataset
train
Network
Architecture
Training
Method
Test
Accuracy
Mean Solve
Time
Median
Solve Time Timeout
Verifiable
Accuracy
Overall
Sparsity
MNIST
0
conv-small BinMask 97.06% 0.002 0.001 0.00% 75.29% 86%
conv-large BinMask+CBD 97.84% 9.661 0.216 5.09% 39.27% 87%
MNIST
0.3
conv-small BinMask 95.53% 0.002 0.002 0.00% 36.41% 91%
conv-large BinMask+CBD 97.05% 2.322 0.028 1.11% 21.52% 88%
CIFAR10
0
conv-small BinMask 51.67% 0.004 0.003 0.00% 0.36% 81%
conv-large BinMask+CBD 65.15% 14.336 1.088 6.64% 0.00% 93%
CIFAR10
8
255
conv-small BinMask 33.18% 0.002 0.002 0.00% 10.79% 88%
conv-large BinMask+CBD 42.35% 0.057 0.043 0.00% 0.15% 81%
All the methods are evaluated on the complete test sets. Time limit is 120 seconds.
on MNIST.
Because of the relatively long verification times for some of
the cases with other solvers or ternary weights, we evaluate
all the methods on a fixed subset containing 40 randomly
sampled examples from the complete test set and summarize
the results in Table 6 and Table 7 for MNIST and CIFAR10
respectively. We evaluate MiniSat 2.2 and Z3 on the
easiest-to-verify models that are trained with BinMask or
BinMask with CBD, but we also run the two solvers on a
small ternary weight model for CIFAR10, to show that Bin-
Mask also benefits other solvers and MiniSatCS is also
more efficient in the ternary weight case. In fact CBD also
helps the other solvers, because when we try to verify the
seemingly easiest-to-verify conv-large network trained
with only BinMask (i.e., the one adversarially trained on CI-
FAR10), MiniSat 2.2 fails due to out of memory error,
and z3 exceeds the one hour time limit. We also present
the corresponding results for MiniSatCS evaluated on the
complete MNIST and CFAR10 test sets in Table 8. For
undefended networks (i.e., trained with  = 0), we verify
the robustness with  = 0.1 for MNIST and  = 2/255 for
CIFAR10. For adversarially trained networks we verify the
robustness with the same perturbation bound for training
(i.e.,  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 8/255 for CFAR10).
7. Conclusion
In this work we demonstrate that it is possible to signifi-
cantly scale up the exact verification of binarized neural
networks (BNNs) by equipping an off-the-shelf SAT solver
with domain-specific propagation rules and simultaneously
training solver-friendly BNNs. Although we focus on verify-
ing adversarial robustness, our method could be generalized
to verify other properties of BNNs. Our experimental results
demonstrate the significant performance increases that our
techniques deliver.
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